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PLANNING, ZONING AND SUBDIVISION LAW
Woodrow W. Turner, Jr.*
Mark R. Herring**
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a debate has sharpened in Virginia concerning
the limits of public power over private property and the determi-
nation of which arm of the government will exercise the public's
power in land use matters. This debate has continued into 1990
and 1991.
One development worth noting is that federal courts now play a
more important role in this debate. Recent land use decisions in
federal courts have tended to afford landowners greater protection
of their property rights. In contrast, Virginia courts have empha-
sized form and procedure over substance in the land use cases de-
cided in 1990 and 1991.
During the 1990 session, the General Assembly actively con-
fronted land use issues and asserted its authority over local gov-
ernments. However, during the 1991 session it seemed constrained
to act on land use issues, perhaps due to pressure from some local
governments for more authority to manage (or prevent) growth.
Yet, those local governments that sought more authority over land
use decisions from the legislature, received additional authority in
only a few instances.
This survey of planning, zoning and subdivision law discusses
significant cases recently decided by the circuit courts of Virginia,
as well as by the various federal courts sitting in Virginia. It also
reviews important statutory changes made to the Code of Virginia
("Code") in the most recent session of the General Assembly.
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II. ZONING
A. Downzoning
Downzoning was a controversial issue in Virginia during the
summer of 1990.1 Seabrooke Partners v. City of Chesapeake2 was a
1990 downzoning case decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
In Seabrooke Partners, the supreme court upheld a trial court's
determination that the City of Chesapeake had met its burden of
producing sufficient evidence of a change in neighborhood circum-
stances to make the reasonableness of a piecemeal downzoning
fairly debatable.3 Seabrooke Partners illustrates the property
owner's heavy burden when challenging even piecemeal downzon-
ings. Even if a property owner makes a prima facie showing that
since the enactment of the prior ordinance there has been no
change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health,
safety, or welfare, the local governing body need only produce suf-
ficient evidence to make the reasonableness of its action fairly de-
batable for the downzoning to be sustained.4
B. Public Notice Requirements and Limitations of Actions
Statutory public notice requirements and a thirty-day limitation
period for filing actions contesting zoning decisions have become
major issues in challenging rezonings. Section 15.1-493(C) of the
Code requires local governing bodies to hold a public hearing after
giving notice, as set forth in section 15.1-431 of the Code, before
enacting or amending a zoning ordinance.5 These notice require-
ments are mandatory conditions precedent to a local governing
body's exercise of its zoning power. If the requirements are not
complied with, the local governing body has no authority to act.
6
1. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1372.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1991) (vesting permitted and permis-
sible uses and densities for property located in the Route 28 Transportation Improvement
District); City of Va. Beach v. Virginia Land Inv. Ass'n, 239 Va. 412, 389 S.E.2d 312 (1990).
2. 240 Va. 102, 393 S.E.2d 191 (1990).
3. Id. at 107, 393 S.E.2d at 194.
4. Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 659, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893
(1974).
5. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-493(C), -431 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
6. Lawrence Transfer & Storage v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 229 Va. 568, 331 S.E.2d 460
(1985); Town of Vinton v. Falcun Corp., 226 Va. 62, 66-67, 306 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1983). In an
unpublished letter opinion, one Virginia circuit court ruled that improper notice was a suffi-
cient reason for denying rezoning because the governing body would have lacked the author-
ity to act. Miller & Smith Land, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 11201, letter op. (County
of Loudoun Cir. Ct. June 22, 1989).
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Section 15.1-493(G) of the Code requires that all actions con-
testing a zoning or special exception decision of a local governing
body be filed within thirty days.7 The thirty-day limitation, how-
ever, is not a statute of limitations. The supreme court in Friends
of Clarke Mountain Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors8
stated that the statute only requires that every action contesting a
zoning decision of a local governing body be filed within thirty
days. Therefore, a suit that is filed in a timely fashion will not be
dismissed for failure to join necessary parties after the thirty-day
period.'
Arguabl:r, if notice of the public hearing was improper, a zoning
decision could be invalidated by the filing of an action after the
thirty-day limitation on the ground that the governing body had
no authority to act, particularly if the failure to challenge the zon-
ing action within thirty days was attributable to improper notice.
The relationship between the public notice requirements and the
thirty-day limitation period arose last year in three Virginia circuit
court cases: Davis v. Stafford County,10 Blankenship v. Board of
Supervisors," and Evans v. Town of Bluefield.12
In Evans, the trial court ruled that because the town of Bluefield
had not given any notice to persons so entitled, a savings provision
relating to an inadvertent failure to mail a notice was inapplicable,
and thus the town was without authority to rezone certain prop-
erty. Because the town had not committed a valid act, the thirty-
day limitation was not applicable. 3
In contrast, the trial court in Davis dismissed a challenge to the
granting of a special use permit for failure to meet the thirty-day
limitation period. The court applied the limitation, even though
the plaintiffs alleged that the improper notice was the reason for
their failure to file within thirty days.' 4
Similarly, the landowners in Blankenship unsuccessfully tried to
use the approach advanced in Davis to challenge a comprehensive
rezoning. They contended that notice of the rezoning was improper
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-493(G) (Cum. Supp. 1991). -
8. 7 V.L.R. 1223, - Va. - S.E.2d - (Va. 1991).
9. Id. at 2778-79, - Va. -, S.E.2d at
10. 20 Va. Cir. 122 (County of Stafford Cir. Ct. 1990).
11. 19 Va. Cir. 254 (County of Washington Cir. Ct. 1990).
12. No. 11-034, letter op. (County of Tazewell Cir. Ct. May 18, 1990).
13. Id.
14. Davis, 20 Va. Cir. at 127-28.
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and, therefore, the rezoning by the governing body was invalid.
However, the trial court found sufficient notice, and dismissed the
action because the landowners failed to meet the thirty-day
limitation.15
The General Assembly passed legislation clarifying that public
notices concerning amendments to a zoning map need not state the
general usage and density ranges in the applicable part of a com-
prehensive plan, if the particular locality has not adopted a com-
prehensive plan with general usage and density ranges. Now, in the
case of a proposed amendment to the zoning map, the public no-
tice must state the general usage and density range of a proposed
amendment and the general usage and density ranges, if any, in
the applicable part of a comprehensive plan.16
C. Standing
Like notice and time limitations, standing could become a more
significant issue in zoning challenges, particularly if citizens groups
continue to contest zoning decisions. In Virginia, "[a] plaintiff has
standing to bring a declaratory judgment proceeding if he has 'a
justiciable interest' in the subject matter of the litigation, either in
his own right or in a representative capacity."' 7
In an unreported decision, one Virginia circuit court ruled that
adjoining property owners were the only plaintiffs with standing to
bring a declaratory judgment action to contest zoning issues.' s In
contrast, the trial court in Meadowbrook-West/Garland Heights
Civic Association v. Chesterfield County,'9 ruled that an associa-
tion that does not own property can have standing to challenge a
zoning ordinance.20 In Meadowbrook-West/Garland Heights, how-
ever, the association was comprised of some adjacent property
owners.
15. Blankenship, 19 Va. Cir. at 257. Regarding the short limitation period, the trial court
stated "[i]f these matters are not brought swiftly to a head, the uncertainty created thereby
will cause confusion, disrupt property sales, and cause financial hardship for property own-
ers and homebuilders." Id.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-493(C) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
17. Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 590, 318 S.E.2d 407, 412 (1984) (quoting
Board of Supervisors v. Fralin & Waldron, 222 Va. 218, 223, 278 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1981)).
18. Hurley v. County of Amelia, No. C90-25, letter op. (County of Amelia Cir. Ct. Jan. 16,
1991).
19. 21 Va. Cir. 81 (County of Chesterfield Cir. Ct. 1990).
20. Id. at 84.
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D. Conditional Zoning
The General Assembly passed legislation making conditional
zoning provisions applicable to towns which have had a population
growth of ten percent or more from the next-to-latest to latest de-
cennial census year.21 This action demonstrates the legislature's
continued willingness to grant greater local authority, in some in-
stances, to those areas of the state which are -experiencing rapid
population growth and pressure. It also signals the acceptance of
conditional zoning as a growth management tool.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND FEDERAL
COURTS
As stated earlier, federal courts now play a more prominent role
in land use matters and afford landowners greater protection of
their property rights. The tendency of federal courts to protect
property rights in land use cases is illustrated by two recent deci-
sions, Potomac Greens Associates Partnership v. City Council of
Alexandria,22 and Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park
Corporation v. Town of Front Royal.2 3
In Potomac Greens, a federal court declared that two of the
three conditions that the City Council of Alexandria imposed on a
developer's application for site plan approval were invalid. The
three conditions were: compliance with the city's transportation
management plan ordinance (TMP), construction of additional
lanes on the George Washington Memorial Parkway (an off-site
highway), and elimination of one level of a proposed parking ga-
rage. Compliance with the TMP would have required the devel-
oper to demonstrate a "significant reduction in the traffic and
transportation impacts of the use. '24
The court held that the TMP was unconstitutionally vague be-
cause it did not contain standards by which the city and applicants
could measure or gauge whether the plans would significantly re-
duce traffic.25 It further held that the city was without authority to
enact the TMP or to condition site plan approval on compliance
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
22. 761 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Va. 1991).
23. 749 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Va. 1990).
24. Potomac Greens, 761 F. Supp. at 417.
25. Id. at 419.
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with it.26 The city asserted that subsections 15.1-491(c) and (h) of
the Zoning Enabling Act granted it the authority to enact the
TMP. Finding the case analogous to Board of Supervisors v.
Horne,2 7 the court found no statutory authority granting Alexan-
dria the ability to enact the TMP. The court stated that the devel-
opment site had been zoned 1-2 since 1931 and that if that zoning
classification was no longer appropriate, the city should have
amended its zoning ordinance.2 8
The court also found no authority for the city's condition that
additional highway lanes be constructed. 9 It determined that the
leading trilogy of Virginia land use cases, Hylton Enterprises v.
Board of Supervisors,0 Cupp v. Board of Supervisors,31 and Board
of Supervisors v. Rowe,32 stood for the proposition that the Code
did not impliedly authorize localities to require a developer of land
to improve public highways as a condition of development.33 Since
the city also lacked express authority to make the requirement, the
court invalidated the condition.3 4
In Front Royal, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia awarded damages for a taking which the court
previously determined had occurred.35 The legal basis for the land-
owners' claims was Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States
Code. On the issue of damages, the court analogized the takings in
question to regulatory takings, because the town of Front Royal
had taken affirmative steps to prevent the landowners from devel-
26. Potomac Greens, 761 F. Supp. at 421.
27. 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 453 (1975). In Horne, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County had no authority under the Code to enact an
ordinance suspending the filing of site plans and subdivision plats pending amendment of
its zoning ordinance. Id. at 122, 215 S.E.2d at 459.
28. Potomac Greens, 761 F. Supp. at 421.
29. Id.
30. 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979).
31. 227 Va. 580, 318 S.E.2d 407 (1984).
32. 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
33. Potomac Greens, 761 F. Supp. at 421.
34. The court found that under its police power, Alexandria had a sufficient safety consid-
eration for requiring the elimination of one level of the parking garage. Id. at 422.
35. In 1989, the federal court found that the failure of the town of Front Royal to connect
municipal sewer service to the property of the complaining landowners effected a taking of
the landowners' property and violated their due process rights. The obligation to provide
public utilities was specifically and clearly required by an annexation order. Front Royal
and Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 708 F. Supp. 1477, 1487-88
(W.D. Va. 1989).
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oping their properties. 6 Citing opinions of the Eighth and Elev-
enth Circuits, the court found the appropriate measure of damages
to be the difference in value between what the landowners would
have had, absent the taking, and what remained after the taking,
plus interest.37
In another federal case, James City County v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency,38 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia overturned a veto by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), of an
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") permit which was necessary to
impound a navigable waterway needed to create the Ware Creek
Reservoir. The reservoir had been proposed to serve the water way
needs of James City County. The court found that the EPA,
which, under certain circumstances, is empowered under section
404(c) of the Clean Water Act to veto Corps permits, should not
have applied a presumption that alternative water supplies were
available to James City County. 9 Additionally, the court deter-
mined that even if the EPA's application of the presumption had
been correct, the record showed that no practicable alternatives
were available to James City County.4
0
IV. VESTED RIGHTS
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that informal governmen-
tal approvals do not satisfy the governmental action element re-
quired in vested rights cases. A landowner must show a "significant
official governmental act" to claim the right to use property in a
manner prohibited by subsequent land use legislation.4'
Vested rights cases involve a determination of the time at which
local governments can compel property owners to comply with a
new, valid land use ordinance. Property owners sometimes assert a
right to develop property according to an ordinance which was in
effect at a prior point in time. This is based on the theory that
subsequent property use limititions should not affect a property
36. Front Royal, 749 F. Supp. at 1443.
37. Id. at 1445 (citing Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 896 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1990);
Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985)).
38. No. 69-156-NN, mer. op. (E.D. Va. Nov. 6, 1990).
39. Id. at 8-9.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Town of Stephens City v. Russell, 241 Va. 160, 164, 399 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1991); Notes-
tein v. Board of Supervisors, 240 Va. 146, 152, 393 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1990).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
owner who has incurred substantial expense preparing property for
development according to ordinances then in effect.42
Until this year, the two leading Virginia cases on vested rights
were Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc.4 and Board
of Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil,44 both decided in 1972. In both
of these cases, the supreme court held that the landowners had
vested rights to use land under a certain zoning classification and
could not be deprived of those rights by subsequent legislation,
when the landowners had obtained special use permits, filed site
plans, and incurred substantial expense toward developing their
property in reliance on existing zoning.45
Two recent cases, Notestein v. Board of Supervisors41 and Town
of Stephens City v. Russell47 address at what point in the develop-
ment process a landowner acquires a vested right. A third case,
Holland v. Johnson,4 discusses which governmental body is em-
powered to decide when a landowner acquires a vested right.
In Notestein, the supreme court ruled that an essential element
in vesting cases is the presence of "significant official acts" by a
governmental entity.49 The Notesteins filed an application for a
landfill permit with the Virginia Department of Waste Manage-
ment ("Waste Management"), which notified Appomattox County
where the land was situated. The county was required to inform
Waste Management whether the proposed landfill was consistent
with the zoning ordinance. At that time, no zoning ordinance ex-
isted which would have prohibited the Notesteins from using their
property as a landfill.50 After filing the application, the Notesteins
received several informal approvals, including: Waste Manage-
ment's notification that their property was suitable for a landfill;
Waste Management's advice that they conduct hydrogeological
42. Frequently localities will, as a matter of "legislative grace," make this determination
by establishing a "grandfather clause" which exempts property owners already in the devel-
opment process from the new law. For a complete discussion of vested rights, see Hanes &
Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373
(1989).
43. 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972).
44. 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972).
45. Medical Structures, 213 Va. at 358, 192 S.E.2d at 801; Cities Service Oil, 213 Va. at
362, 193 S.E.2d at 3.
46. 240 Va. 146, 393 S.E.2d 205 (1990).
47. 241 Va. 160, 399 S.E.2d 814 (1991).
48. 241 Va. 553, 403 S.E.2d 356 (1991).
49. 240 Va. at 152, 393 S.E.2d at 208.
50. Id. at 148-49, 393 S.E.2d at 206.
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and geotechnical studies; the County Administrator's advice that
the county had no legal basis to stop the landfill; and the assur-
ances of individual members of the Board of Supervisors that any
zoning ordinance that might be adopted would not prohibit their
landfill."I However, even though the Notesteins had secured fi-
nancing for the landfill and rejected purchase offers on a good faith
reliance upon the informal approvals, the supreme court held that
they were not protected from the subsequent enactment of a zon-
ing ordinance preventing the landfill. The court rejected an estop-
pel argument, ruling that estoppel does not apply to the govern-
ment in the discharge of its governmental functions.5 2 Instead, the
court adopted the "significant official governmental act" require-
ment, which it also applied in the Russell case. 3
In Russell, a landowner sought subdivision and site plan ap-
proval for a land use which was permissible under the zoning ordi-
nance of the Town of Stephens City.54 Yet, because the subdivision
plat and site plan that Russell filed had not been approved at the
time the town changed its zoning ordinance, there was no "signifi-
cant official governmental act" entitling Russell to vested rights in
the previously existing zoning classification. 5
The supreme court's application of the "significant official gov-
ernmental act" requirement in Russell makes clear that property
owners have less protection for permissible uses than for permitted
uses. 6 This decreased protection, in turn, will decrease the pre-
dictability of permissible land uses. Additionally, the decreased
protection may create pressure on the General Assembly to enact
comprehensive vesting legislation in the future.
In Holland, the third vested rights case, the supreme court ruled
51. Id. at 149-50, 393 S.E.2d at 206-07.
52. Id. at 152, 393 S.E.2d at 208.
53. Russell, 241 Va. at 164-65, 399 S.E.2d at 816.
54. Id. at 161-63, 399 S.E.2d at 814-15.
55. Id. at 164-65, 399 S.E.2d at 816.
56. Arguably, the Supreme Court of Virginia may have overlooked the substance of its
earlier decision. The court stated in Medical Structures: "[T]he site plan has virtually re-
placed the building permit as the most vital document in the development process .... The
filing of such a plan creates a monument to the developer's intention, and when the plan is
approved, the building permit, except in rare situations, will be issued." Medical Structures,
213 Va. at 357-58, 192 S.E.2d at 801. As Hanes and Minchew asserted in their article, "[t]he
critical meaning of these passages suggests. . . that a filed site plan for a permissible use is
no different from a filed site plan for a permitted use and that both uses deserve the same
degree of vesting protection upon bona fide site plan filing." Hanes & Minchew, supra note
42, at 407.
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that the power to determine when a property owner acquires a
vested right rests solely with the courts.57 The Zoning Administra-
tor of Franklin County opined that Rockydale Quarries had a
vested right to operate a quarry which could not be impaired by a
subsequent zoning ordinance.5 8 Based on a separation of powers
argument and a lack of authority in the Code, the supreme court
held that a zoning administrator was not empowered to make
vested rights determinations.5 9
V. SUBDIVISIONS
A. Court Actions
The case of Hylton Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors"°
continues to shape subdivision law in Virginia. Hylton is recog-
nized for the proposition that local governing bodies do not have
the statutory authority, express or implied, to require subdividers
to construct improvements to existing roads." Hylton, along with
Cupp v. Board of Supervisors2 and Board of Supervisors v.
Rowe,65 strongly suggests that even when local governing bodies do
have the statutory authority to require subdividers to construct
improvements, the need for those improvements must be substan-
tially generated by the subdivision itself in order for such authori-
zation to meet constitutional standards. 4
Based on Hylton, the Virginia circuit court in Smith v. Board of
Supervisors,65 held that Culpeper County could not deny a subdi-
57. Holland, 241 Va. at 556, 403 S.E.2d at 357.
58. Id. at 554, 403 S.E.2d at 357.
59. Id. at 556, 403 S.E.2d at 357.
60. 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979).
61. Id. at 440-41, 258 S.E.2d at 581. Subject to statutory procedures and requirements,
certain localities are authorized by road impact fee statutes to impose impact fees on new
developments to pay all or a part of the cost of reasonable road improvements attributable
in substantial part to the development. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-498.1 to -498.10 (Repl. Vol.
1989).
62. 227 Va. 580, 318 S.E.2d 407 (1984).
63. 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
64. For example, in an Opinion of the Attorney General dated August 16, 1990, the Attor-
ney General opined that a local governing body could only constitutionally require dedica-
tion of avigation easements as a condition of subdivision approval if the need for the ease-
ments were generated by the proposed subdivision itself. Under the facts presented in the
opinion, the presence of the airport, not the subdivision, created the need for the easements.
1990 Report of the Att'y Gen. 94-97 (1990). Also, some federal cases such as Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), suggest a similar nexus is also constitutionally
required.
65. No. 145-C-89, letter op. (County of Culpeper Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 1990).
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vision plat because a provision in the subdivision ordinance re-
quired "off-site" improvements by the subdividers to public
roads.66 Smith is also important because the subdivision plat in
question did not comply with the density requirements of the
county's comprehensive plan, though it did comply with its zoning
ordinance.6 7 Based on Board of Supervisors v. Safeco68 and Board
of Supervisors v. Snell Construction Corp., 9 which held that a
comprehensive plan is not a zoning ordinance but a guideline for
zoning ordinances, the court ruled that "provisions of a compre-
hensive plan, not carried out by the zoning ordinance, cannot be
used as a basis to deny a subdivision which conforms to the zoning
ordinance and the requirements of the subdivision ordinance." 70
In Fairview Co. v. Board of Supervisors,7 1 the Spotsylvania
County Circuit Court stated in dictum that a subdivision plat may
properly be disapproved where it violates the zoning ordinance.7 2
In Fairview, however, the review agent refused to accept the subdi-
vision plat for review because of the plat's nonconformity with the
county's zoning ordinance. The court stated that the review agent
did not have the authority to refuse to review a plat that met the
basic submittal requirements. 73
When a planning commission or other agent disapproves a sub-
division plat and the subdivider believes the disapproval was im-
proper, the subdivider has a right to appeal to the appropriate cir-
cuit court within sixty days. 4 In Folan v. Town of Kilmarnock,7 5
the Lancaster County Circuit Court ruled that the Council of the
Town of Kilmarnock could not require that a subdivider first ap-
peal to the council, before taking an appeal to the appropriate cir-
cuit court.
In another Lancaster County case, Board of Supervisors v. Cab-
ell Cove Associates,6 the court held that a land developer could
not avoid the requirements of a subdivision ordinance by artifi-
66. Smith, letter op. at 4.
67. Id. at 1-2.
68. 226 Va. 329, 310 S.E.2d 445 (1983).
69. 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
70. Smith, No. 145-C-89, letter op. at 2.
71. 21 Va. Cir. 193 (County of Spotsylvania Cir. Ct. 1990).
72. Id. at 195-96.
73. Id. at 196-97.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-475 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
75. No. 161-1990, letter op. (County of Lancaster Cir. Ct. Nov. 26, 1990).
76. 20 Va. Cir. 245 (County of Lancaster Cir. Ct. 1990).
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cially attaching land in remote areas to lots in more desirable ar-
eas. In Cabell Cove Associates, the court considered a plat that
technically did not come within the county's definition of a subdi-
vision, and therefore, arguably, was not subject to the provisions of
the county's subdivision ordinance. The court ordered the plat to
be vacated because the plat's unusual and contorted lot shapes vio-
lated the spirit and purpose of the ordinance. 77
B. Legislative Changes
Relating to the subdivision of land for the purpose of sale or gift
to a member of the immediate family, the General Assembly en-
acted legislation expanding the definition of "immediate family" to
include the grandchildren and grandparents of the owner.78 The
General Assembly also enacted legislation allowing a governing
body to make partial releases of bonds, or other performance guar-
antees, where the released amount is less than eighty percent of
the original amount.79 However, a partial release will not be al-
lowed until "thirty percent of the facilities, covered by any bond,
escrow, letter of credit, or other performance guarantee" are
completed.80
VI. AFFORDABLE HOUSING
In 1990, the General Assembly provided certain local govern-
ments, including Fairfax County, with the authority to require de-
velopers to provide affordable housing units, with compensation
being given to the developers in the form of increased density over
the amount normally permitted by the existing zoning district.8 " In
1991, the General Assembly expanded the list of eligible local gov-
ernments that previously could adopt affordable housing amend-
ments; and it added to and clarified certain regulations that local
governments may include in their affordable housing programs.8 2
77. Cabell Cove Associates, 20 Va. at 248-49.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466(A)(12) (Cum. Supp. 1991). The General Assembly did not
amend § 15.1-466(A)(13) of the Code which is analogous to § 15.1-466(A)(12), except that
the former applies to Fairfax County and the latter applies to all other counties and the
City of Suffolk.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 15.1-491.8, -491.9.
82. Id. § 15.1-491.9(A) to (B). Among the more significant additional permissible regula-
tions are:
1. Application, at the discretion of the local governing body, of the requirements of an
[Vol. 25:841
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In addition, it authorized Arlington County to acquire easements
designed to maintain the market rents of a portion of the units of
any multi-family residential property at a percentage of the mar-
ket rent for the remaining units of the property.s3
The General Assembly also passed legislation affecting manufac-
tured housing. Manufactured housing presented an important op-
portunity to create affordable home ownership because it has an
inherently lower cost than conventional on-site construction. The
General Assembly responded to the growing community accept-
ance of manufactured housing as a valued component of a local-
ity's housing stock.
The General Assembly established a nine-member Virginia Man-
ufactured Housing Board to issue licenses to manufacturers, deal-
ers, brokers, and salespersons in the manufactured housing indus-
try and to otherwise govern and regulate the industry.8 4 There are
also new provisions that deal with set-up and tie down require-
ments,85 warranties,86 and the establishment of a new recovery
fund to pay claims arising out of violations of the manufactured
housing statutes.87
VII. LAND USE TAXATION
Land enrolled in Virginia's land use assessment program receives
a reduced real property tax assessment.88 Lots which are at least
five acres and are devoted solely to agricultural use or open-space
use, and forest lots equal to or exceeding twenty acres qualify for
affordable housing program to a site which is the subject of a site plan or subdivision
plat, is expected to yield 50 or more units, and has approved sewer. Id. § 15.1-
491.9(B)(2).
2. Up to a twenty percent increase in density for qualifying sites with 12.5 percent of
the total units set aside as affordable dwelling units. In the event the 20 percent in-'
crease is not achieved, the 12.5 percent ratio is reduced proportionately. Id. § 15.1-
491.9(B)(3).
3. Requirements that the affordable dwelling units be built "and offered for sale or
rental concurrently with the construction and certificate of occupancy of a reasonable
proportion of the market rate units." Id. § 15.1-491.9(B)(14).
83. Id. § 15.1-687.4. This legislation was effective March 11, 1991.
84. Id. §§ 36-85.17 to -85.18; see also id. §§ 36-85.19 to -85.21 (setting forth licensure
requirements; grounds for denying, suspending or revoking licenses; and notice and hearing
requirements).
85. Id. § 36-85.22.
86. Id. § 36-85.23 to -85.25.
87. Id. § 36-85.31 to -85.36.
88. Id. § 58.1-3231, -3233 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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this special tax assessment program 9
Governing bodies have had the authority to reduce the qualified
lot size to two acres for land devoted to open-space use in certain
scenic areas and certain areas with high population density.90 In an
effort to encourage open-space use in Fairfax County, the General
Assembly in 1991 granted it the authority to reduce the qualified
lot size to two acres for land devoted to open-space use in the
county."1 Some high-growth areas may seek similar authority from
the General Assembly in the future.
For land devoted to open-space use to qualify for the special tax
assessment program, the land must also be (i) situated in an agri-
cultural, forestall, or agricultural and forestall district; or (ii) sub-
ject to a recorded perpetual easement held by a public body that
promotes open space use; or (iii) subject to a recorded commitment
entered into by the landowner with the local governing body not to
change to a non-qualifying use for a time period of not less than
four nor more than ten years.92
VIII. CONDEMNATION
A. Legislative Changes
The General Assembly created a test area designed to examine
whether the currently existing system of appointing condemnation
commissioners results in higher condemnation costs to the Com-
monwealth, compared to the test system of condemnation. This
test area consists of several Northern Virginia localities, including
the counties of Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun and Prince William,
and the cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, and Falls Church.
Under the currently existing system of condemnation, if the par-
ties cannot agree upon the names of commissioners to be sum-
moned, when the issue of just compensation is to be determined by
a commission, each party presents to the court a list of six free-
holders, from which the court selects nine persons to be summoned
as commissioners. The petitioner and the owners each have two
peremptory challenges and the remaining five persons are
89. Id. § 58.1-3233.2.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 58.1-3233.3.
93. Act of Mar. 23, 1991, ch. 520, 1 1991 Va. Acts 838, 839, cl. 2.
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Under the test system, when the Commonwealth Transportation
Commissioner is the condemnor in any of the designated Northern
Virginia localities, jury commissioners select condemnation com-
missioners in the same manner that juries are selected. 5 The clerk
draws nine names, plus two alternate names, from the list submit-
ted by the jury commission and then notifies those persons whose
names were drawn to appear in court on the date set for trial.96
The commissioners who appear on that day are called to be sworn
on their voir dire until a disinterested and impartial panel is ob-
tained.9 7 Depending on the number of jurors excused for cause, if
any, each party may exercise an equal number of peremptory
strikes to reduce the number of commissioners to five. 8 If fewer
then seven commissioners remain before the court prior to the ex-
ercise of preemptory strikes, the trial may proceed and be heard by
less than five commissioners provided the parties agree; but no
trial shall proceed with fewer than three commissioners. 9
In another legislative change, the General Assembly enacted a
definition of "freeholder." For purposes of the chapter on condem-
nation, "freeholder" means any person owning an interest in land
in fee, including a person owning a condominium unit. 00
B. Judicial Action
Under section 25-46.34(a) of the Code, a condemnor may obtain,
as a matter of right, a voluntary dismissal of a condemnation pro-
ceeding if no hearing has begun on the issue of just compensation
and the condemnor has not acquired the title or lesser interest in
the property or taken possession of the property.10' Section 25-
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
95. Id. §§ 25-46.20, -46.20:1. As under the currently existing system of selecting condem-
nation commissioners, to be eligible as commissioners under the test system persons must
be (1) residents of the county or city in which the property to be condemned, or the greater
portion thereof, is situated, and (2) disinterested freeholders of property within the jurisdic-
tion. Id. § 25-46.20:1.
96. Id. § 25-46.20:2.
97. Id. § 25-46.20:4.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 25-46.3.
101. Id. § 25-46.34(a) (Repl. Vol. 1985). In such an instance, the petitioner is required to
pay the owners' reasonable expenses actually incurred in preparing for trial on the issue of
just compensation. Id.
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46.34(b) of the Code gives the condemnor the same right after a
hearing has begun on the issue of just compensation, if the con-
demnor has not acquired title or a lesser interest in the property or
taken possession of the property.10 2 Section 25-46.34 is silent, how-
ever, as to dismissals in cases where the condemnor has acquired
title or an interest in the property or taken possession of the prop-
erty. In Trout v. Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner,10 3
the supreme court decided that a condemnor has no right to a non-
suit or a voluntary dismissal of a condemnation proceeding, with-
out the owners' consent, after any interest in, or possession of, the
property has been acquired.
10 4
In Trout, the trial court granted a condemnor's motion for a
nonsuit pursuant to section 8.01-380 of the Code. The condemnor,
who had already taken title and possession of the property, had
moved for a nonsuit after the trial court granted the owners' mo-
tion in limine precluding the condemnor from adducing any expert
testimony at trial. The condemnor had failed to comply with a pre-
vious order to provide complete and full responses to interrogato-
ries requesting identification of expert witnesses and summaries of
their expected testimony. 0 5
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court noted that the
Code requires all condemnation proceedings to be brought and
conducted according to the provisions of the Virginia Condemna-
tion Act "[u]nless otherwise specifically provided by law."'0 6 It
held that the nonsuit statute, which permits a party to suffer a
nonsuit as a matter of right "as to any cause of action or claim,"
was not such a specific provision because a condemnation proceed-
ing is not brought as a cause of action."'07 Citing Hamer v. School
Board of Chesapeake,05 which was decided last year, the supreme
court stated that the parties to a condemnation proceeding are not
in the same position as plaintiffs and defendants in traditional ac-
tions or suits, and that the traditional burdens of proof rules are
inapplicable.10
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.34(b). Like dismissals before a hearing, the petitioner is re-
quired to pay the owners' expenses. Id.
103. 241 Va. 69, 400 S.E.2d 172 (1991).
104. Id. at 75, 400 S.E.2d at 174-75.
105. Id. at 71, 400 S.E.2d at 172-73.
106. Id. at 72, 400 S.E.2d at 173 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 72-73, 400 S.E.2d at 173-74.
108. 240 Va. 66, 393 S.E.2d 623 (1990).
109. Trout, 241 Va. at 73, 400 S.E.2d at 174.
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Hamer involved the question of which condemnation-related
questions courts could review. The question of whether a taking is
for a public purpose is a judicial question, reviewable by the
courts, but the question of the necessity of the project is a legisla-
tive one, unless the legislature provides otherwise by statute. 110
Courts can only review the condemnor's discretion in determining
the location and quality of property to be taken, if the discretion
was exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.111
According to the scheme of shifting burdens outlined in Hamer,
when a condemnee alleges that the condemnor has arbitrarily and
capriciously decided upon the location or quantity of property to
be taken, the condemnee has the burden of production on that is-
sue. If the condemnee establishes a prima facie case, the burden of
production shifts to the condemnor to produce sufficient evidence
to show that the issue was fairly debatable. If the condemnor satis-
fies that burden, the condemnor's determination will be upheld.11 2
In The Lamar Corp. v. City of Richmond,11 3 the supreme court
ruled that lessors, whose structures are annexed to land taken
under power of eminent domain, are not entitled to a separate pro-
ceeding to ascertain just compensation. With respect to the lease-
hold, the court ruled that when the condemned property is subject
to a lease, the lessee is not a proper party to the condemnation
proceeding.114 Instead, the entire compensation is ascertained as
though the property belonged to one person, and then that sum is
apportioned among the different parties according to their respec-
tive rights.115
With respect to the structures, as between the condemnor and
the lessees, those structures attached to the condemned real estate
but owned by the lessees are realty, regardless of whether the
structures would be deemed realty under fixture law.1 6 The court
110. Hamer, 240 Va. at 70, 393 S.E.2d at 625 (citing Stewart v. Highway Comm'r, 212 Va.
689, 692, 187 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1972)). Section 15.1-237 of the Code, by cross-reference to
other sections, does subject the necessity of some takings to judicial review under certain
circumstances, but not the particular project involved in Hamer. Id.
111. Id. at 71-72, 393 S.E.2d at 626 (citing Kricorian v. C & P Tel. Co., 217 Va. 284, 288,
277 S.E.2d 725, 728 (1976)).
112. Id. at 71-72, 393 S.E.2d at 626-27.
113. 241 Va. 346, 402 S.E.2d 31 (1991).
114. Id. at 350, 402 S.E.2d at 33.
115. Id. (citing Fonticello Mineral Springs Co. v. City of Richmond, 147 Va. 355, 369, 137
S.E. 458, 463 (1927)).
116. Id. at 351-52, 402 S.E.2d at 34.
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ruled, however, that like leaseholds, title to the structures passes to
the condemnor as an incident of the entire taking, and the value of
the structure is included in the total award. The lessee becomes
entitled to a share of the total award, and thus to a subsequent
proceeding to determine the appropriate amount of that share, but
not to a separate condemnation proceeding. 117
IX. CONCLUSION
Issues concerning the development of private property and the
limitations of local government authority over it, will likely con-
tinue to grow in importance in the Commonwealth. Furthermore,
bills carried over from last year, crafted to grant localities more
power, will be tested again in the legislative process.
117. The Lamar Corp., 241 Va. at 352, 402 S.E.2d at 34.
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